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No.
11934
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GOLD CROSS SERVICES, INC.,
Cross-Claimant and Appellant,
vs.
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF SALT LAKE
CITY CORPORATION, and INTERMOUNTAIN
AMBULANCE SERVICE, INC., a utah corporation,

Crnss and Counter-Defendants and Respondents.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
OF THE CASE
Appt>llant's CounterelaiE1 and Cross-Claim attack
the validity of

Salt Lake City ordinance requiring a

cc•rtifieatP of conn'nience and necessity as a condition
to operate arnbnlanct>s for hire on Salt Lake City streets.

2

DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN THE
LUWER COUR1'

The Distriet Court of Salt Lake County, the Honorable Merrill C. Faux held the ordinance valid and dismissed the counterclaim and cross-claim. A certificate
of convenience and necessity issued to appellant was
declared void as prayed in the complaint and the complaint was otherwise dismissed as moot.

RELIEF 80UGH1' ON APPEAL
Respondents pray the judgment be affirmed an<l
that they bP awarded their eosts.

In addition to ap1wllant\; stat<'nwnt of facts, the
lowing are material:

fo].

Appellant's answer (R-lG) and amended answer an<l
counterclaim (R-29) did not allege tlw amendment to the
ordinance of June 18, 19G8, but admitted tlw amlmlance
ordinance ·was as attached to plaintiff's complaint. The
amendment to tlw ordinance was nPV<>I' before the Court
nntil written stipulation on November 10, 19G9 (R-991.
just beforp

of the j ndg1r1ent app<'aled from on

NovPmbN 14, 1%9 (R-102).
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Pursuant to \Vritten stipulation of all parties, a
formal two clay hearing was held in June, 1969, to determine the issue of convenience and necessity for issuance
of the amlmlance certificates sought by appellant before a
hearing Pxarniner of the Pnhlic Service Commission appoi ntecl by the Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake
City Corporation to hear the matter and submit a
recommended Report and Order. Following the examiner's recommendation, the City Corrnnission on September 4, 19G9 denied the application (R-97-98), which made
the injunctive relief prayed for in the complaint moot.
At the time of making the written stipulation so
that final jnd;..,r:ment could

entered herein without the

necessity of trial (R-9G), appellant made no offer of

proof or any claim whatosev<:'r that it had incurred any
clamag<'s or claimed damages.
Appellant does not appeal from the District Court's
declaration that the certificate of convenience and necessit)' issued it by the City without hearing was void.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE ORDINANCE, TITLE 44, CHAPTER 2, IS NOT
VOID;

SALT

LAKE CITY CORPORATION HAS

AUTHORITY TO PASS SUCH ORDINANCE.
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Title 44, Chapter Reyised OrdinanePs of Salt Lake
City, rPlating to
regulation, is idmtieal, as
pertains to the requirenwnt of certificate of convenience
and necessity, to Title 43, Chapter 2, regulating taxicabs and TitlP 45, Chapter 2, regulating special transportation vehicles or so-called "wheel chair coaches."
Hence, the validity of thost> ordinances may also be
affected by this attack on the amhulanee ordinances,
not only in Salt Lah City, hnt in oth'('"r citiPH of tlw statr.
U.C.A., rn53, JH"ovides as to city powtirs:

J 0-8-39: '"l'hey may licensu, tax and n•gulatP
; stages and hnses, sight-seeing and tonring
cars or vt>hicles, cabs and taxicabs, and
therefor; ... hackmen, draymen, and drivers of
stages, busPs, sight-sPeing and touring cars, cabs
and bxicahs and otlH'l' public conveyances, porters, Pxpressrnen and draynwn and all others pursuing like occnpations, and prPscrihe their corn1wnsation. . . "
10-8-14: ''They may constr11ct, mai1itain and
operate wat<:'n\·orlrn, s<>wPr collt>ction, sPWPr treatment systems, gas works, PlE'ctric light work:;,
tt'IPphoni> li1ws or 1mlJlic tn111sportatio11 systems.
or authorize the constn1ction, rnainknanel' and
operation of tl11' same lJy others, or purchase or
lease sneh "-orks or S,\'Skms from any iierson or
corporation, and
may s<>ll and delivt>r the
surplns produet or c;<'rviee
snrli
works, not n•quin•d
tli<> city or its rnhah1tants,
to otltPrs lw
t IH• Ii mi ts of tlie ei ty." ( ernphas1i'
added.)
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10-8-11 : "r:l_'hey may regulate the use of
sfreeh;, alleys, avenues, sidewalks, crosswalks,
parks and public grounds, prevent and remove
thereof, and provide for the hghtmg, sprinkling and cleaning of
the sanw."

10-8-30. "They may regulate the movement
of traffic on the streets, sidewalks and public
plact>s, including the movement of pedestrians as
w<'ll as of vehicles, and the cars and engines of
railroads, street railroads and tramways, ... "
10-8-Gl. "They ma>' make reg1Lla tions to secure the general health of the city, prevent the
introduction of contagious, infections or malignant disease into the city, and make quarantine
laws and enforce the same within the corporate
limits and within 12 rnil<:'s tlwreof .... "
10-8-80. "They may raise revenue by levying
and eollecting a licensP fee or tax on any business
within the limits of the city, and regulate th!'
sauw by ordinance; provided, ... no enumeration
of powers of cities containPd in this chapter,
shall he de('mPd to limit or restrict the general
grant of authority lwrehy conferrt>d .... "
10-8-8-t "rI'lwy rnav pass all ordinances and
rn!Ps, and makP
n:gulations, not repugnant
to law, m·<·<·ssary for carrying into effect or diseltarging all pow<>rs and duti<>s conferred by this
diapt<>r, an<l sueh as are neeessary and proper
to provid<• for tlw safety and preservee the health,
and promot1• the prosperity, improve the morals,
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peace and good order, comfort and convenience
of the city and the inhabitants thereof, and for
the protection of property therein .... "
Utah Constitution, Article XI, S<•dion 5, provides:
"The power to he conferred upon the cities''
(forming charters) "by this section shall include
the following: ... (b) to furnish all local public
services, to purchase, hire, construct, own, maintain or 01wrate, or lease, public utilities local in
extent and nse; to ac(1nire by condemnation, or
other1\rise, within or "·ithont the corporate limits,
property m•cessary for an;.· such pm'JJOS("s, suLj ect to restrictions imposed by
law for
the protection of other conunnnitit>s; and to grant
local public utility franchises and within its power
rt>gnlate tlw exercise thneof."
A.

THE POWER CONFERRED BY 10-8-39 AND

10-8-14, U.C.A. 1953 GIVES POWER TO PASS THE
ORDINANCE.

rrhese SPCtions give cities IJOWl'l' to reg·n)ate public
transportation systems.
language clearly includes
the power to rf'gulatr- amhnlanc0s.
Section 10-8-14, at the tinw of JudgP Hanson's snrnmary judgment on
4,
(R-49), n•ad ''street
railwavs," lmt ChaptPr
SPction 1, Laws of 19GO.
chang1c:d th<' words to "public transportation
and this was in dfrct at tlw ti11w of .Judge Fanx's jndg-
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ment of November 14, 1969 (R-102), from which appeal
is taken. Now there can be no doubt whatever that cities
may operate, or may authorize others to operate, ambulancP companies.
Ap1wllant's brief entirely overlooks this change in
the statute and since the whole appeal is bottomed on
the claimed lack of city po\Yer to authorize others to
operate ambulance companies, the appeal must fail.

Rich v. Sa.lt Lake City, 20 Utah 339, 437 P.2d 690
(1968), held, as to the language, "they may ... operate
... street railways," in Section 14 that wht>n the Legislature adopted the language in 1907, it intended to grant
the citieR power to opm·ate motor bus systems. It expressly

Utah Rapid Transit Co. v. Ogden City,

89 Utah 546, 58 P.2d 1, relied upon by appellant. That
case concluded the language of the statute did not permit a city to operate a motor bus systc>m.
Section 10-8-39 has been in effect in substantially
the same language, since at least 1888 ( C.L. 1888, Dec.
1755, p. 37). It ga n• citiPs

}lO\\'<'r:

'''l1o license, tax and rt>gnlate the business conJucted hv haclrnwn, ... calmwn, ... and all others
like occupation and to prescribe their
.
,,
corn w·nsa ti on;

8
If the 1907 Legislature intended motor buses to be vvithin "street railways," then clearly the 1888 Legit;lature
intended ambulances to be within "hackmen, cabmen and
all others pursuing like occupation"
respect to tht>
power of cities to regulate and prescribe compensation.
Utah Light & Traction Co. v. Pitb.Zic Service Comm.,
101 Utah 99, 118 P.2d 683 (1941) cited by appellant is
not applicable. There, the plaintiff attacked the Public
Service Commission's granting of regular route passenger bus authority through various towns, saying tlw
applicant Airways did not comply with tlie statute rPquiring it to "file . . . such evidence as shall be required by the commission to show such application has
received the rrquired consent, franchise or pennit of thr
proper county, city, municipal or other public authority."

This Court rejected the contention, saying (1) there
was no indication tlw Commission required any snrh
evidence, (2) tlrn "(•vidence show('d ... (applieant) had
a franchise in Salt Lake City, ... and had made arrangement for all necessary franchises in all towns where it
proposed to operate," and (3) thPn' was no uyidenc<'
that cities required such permits or franchisPs. Further,
the Court said the statute requiring consent "does not
apply to certificates snch as that hPre inn)lved but only
to tho classes specified in tlw subdi,-ision itst>lf," that is,
classes pertaining to the "construction ... of the confrmplated ... railroad ... " etc, meaning those utilitil'S
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with physical operating facilities in the streets. That
is the holding of the case. The case's statement that a
city has no statutory power to require an automobile
corporation to have a local franchise, upon which ap1wllant relies, is dicta. Note the Court prefaced that
i:;tatenwnt with the clause: ''This is further evident. ... "
'l1lie statPment is based on the following reasoning:
'''l'lwre is no power granted to require or
grant a franchise for the nsc> of the streets and
highways for the purpose of traveling thereon
as used by the public generally. A franchise is
the privilege of doing that which does not belong
to the citizens generally by a c01mnon right....
As to streets, it is the right to do something in
the public highway which except for the grant
·would he a trespass . . . . '[1lrns, the right to lay
mil, or pipes, or string wire or set poles along
a public stn'et is not an ordinary business in
"·hieh everyone may engage, or a use everyone
may maln' of the sh'ec•t, hut is a special privilege,
a franchise to lw grnnkd for the accomplishment
of imhlic objects. 'rhey are required only in cases
in which it is sought to impose upon the street
a special burden which cannot he imposed generthis is, to burden tlw street with a special
privilPge which the public generally may not likewise enjoy. Bnsiness such as that of the Airways
dews not so hmden the street. It uses the streets
onlv for purposPs of tra,·el and transport in the
sm;w manner as tlw public generally. It is a
hnsiness not snhject to franchise rPqnirements."
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That ambulances, being emergency vehicles not
subject to the ordinary traffic mies [41-6-14(a), 41-63(a), U.C.A. 1953], use the streets specially and differently than ordinary citizens is obvions; the ambulance
business may therefore be franchis0d by cities.
Finally, the stat('Uwnt relied on by ap1wllant is bad
law, in light of cast's herein cited and from the logic
of the case itself. The case says:
"Tlwy
grant franchises to railroads,
street railways, tramwa:'•s and union railroad depot companies (
15-8-33)' to waterworks,
gas companies, electric light and telephone lines
(Section 15-8-14); to telPgra.ph and all wire lines
and pole lines ( 8ection 15-8-21 ; to gas, electric
or lighting works (Se<'tion 1;'}-8-20)."
(The citations are to tltP same s<>ctions of 'Title 10,
Cha.ptPT 8, U.C.A. 1953). Only in S<>ction 33 is the ·word
"franchisP" nsed; Sections 14 and
mPrPly iwrrnit
cities to "authorize" the> namPd ntilities, ·while Section
21 permits cities to "regulate" gas or electricity sales
or to "prohihit" tdephon0 or Plectric lines or poles. No
pm,·<·r is
given, hy tlw strict words of the
statutes, to "franchisP" or "prohihit" gas or ·water linrs,
yet the case finds eiti<>s haw irnplit>d powPr to franrhisP
tlwrn from the FX}ll'PSsPd po\n•r to "authoril':P" or "n·g-nalte" th<>rn. Notwithstamling expn•ss statntory powPr
.t1.<'S to "r<>irnlatt> . . . lmsrs" . . . and "other
g1\'l'Il Cl
<,
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public conveyances," by 15-8-39, U.C.A. 1953, the Court's
dicta says cities have no power to franchise automobile
corporations. r:J'his makes little sense.
Since the case says citiPs may grant franchises to
ihose utilities in Section 14, which now includes "public
transportation companies" (L. 19G9, ch. 28, 1:;ec. 1), then
the case is authority for rP1:>pondents' position, not appellant's.
Perhaps the reason for the Court's dicta is that the
case pertains to regular route passenger-bus operations,
which wen• and are not exempt from the Motor Vehicle
Act (L. 1935, Ch. G5, Sec. 13; 54-G-12, U.C.A. 1953),
and lteuce could in no event be franchised by cities, while
nmbnlances and taxis operating within 15 miles of the
radius of any cit:-- are exempt and lwnce are subject to
no regulation ·whatevl'r unlPss it be by cities. Having
in mind only non-exempt 01wrations which a city could
in no event franchise, it lwcame eas:-- for the Court to
gern•ral dicta with respect to non-exempt carriers
1vltich obviously would not have been intt•nded to apply
to ext'rnpt carriPrs, had thP distinction been considered.
Snch dicta eannot have been intended to apply to these
(•xempt caniPrs, for to so apply the dicta is to preclude
cities, or anyone, from n•gnlating the number of taxis
or arnlmlances operating in a city or the rates charged
tlwn•]Jv notwithstandill'' tl1l' need for regulation and the
• '

r:>
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B. THE POLICE POWER CONFERRED BY SEC-

TIONS 10-8-11, -30, -61, -80, and -84 GIVES THE
CITY POWER TO PASS THE ORDINANCE.

Before discussing further case law supporting the
power of the city to regulate ambulance service, it
should be noted that the business is greatly involved
with the public interest.
The ambulance service directly involves the health
of the conmrnnity since it is the best means of obtaining emergency hospital care for the sick or injured. The
interest in safe, competent and prompt emergency care
justifies the public in being assured: (a) that there are
enough ambulance units to insurE> rf'asonable availability at all times; (b) that all operators receive sufficient return on their investment from the available business so that the required capital equipment can be maintained, replaced and
to as teclmology develops,
and so that tlwre will not he nePdiPss duplication and
waste of waiting tiuw, o\·edwad and eapital investment
by operators; (c) that tPnninals
wisely located so
as to rninimizP tlw travd time between thP iwrson in
need of transportation and the location of the vehiclP
at thf' time of the emPrgency; ( d) that 01wrators are financially sonnd to t•nahll• them to eontinnously render
competent and adeqnate sPrviee; (

that rwrsonnPl arc

properly trained and qualifiPd to rpcognize the type•
of care needt>d, and to render it, pnroute and -,,vhile loading
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and unloading; and (f) that the operating company is
financially n'sponsihle in the event of improper care or
rnal pr act ice.
There' is further public interest since ambulances at
fours must travel at higlwr speeds and otherwise be
exempt from traffic rules, making extraordinary use of
the roadways. This justifies requiring as:mrance that
(a) the drivers are cornpt'tent; (b) the operating company is financially responsible in the event of an automobile accident; and ( c) the mechanical equipment is in
safe condition und0r tl1ese extraordinary circumstances .
ambulance today is no longer a mPre means of
transJJOrtation, dashing lJPll-IIH'li through the streets
whosL' onl.\' imqJOse is to get the patient to the hospital
as fast as possible. Today, arnbulancf's
wry expenvehicles ·with highly sophisticated medical, radio and
telemetry <'qnip11wnt, rnannPd hy fnlly trained personnel, usual!.\· medical studPnts, 1d10s(' objective is to give
tlH' vati<'nt such good care ('n ronte that tlw necessity
of s1wt><ling through traffic can be diminished to the
poillt of elimination. rl1he public intt'rest requires that
not P\'Pl'Y station wagon or lwarse 01Yner with first aid
trninin" lw entitled to a licensr to se1Te such calls as he
ri

might cJ10ose to take, if and when lw wishes.
With t11i::; pulilic intt>n•st in mind, it is clear that
today C'i ties mnst haYC' tile power to regulate ambnlanct>s,
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\Vhen not regulated by the state, and this power is easilv
found in thP broad grant of police powPr from the
The Legislature has grantc>d to cities the general
police power to regulate the nse of the streets and the
movement of traffic thereon, to secure the general health
and welfare of the residents and to reasonably regulate
local transpo1iation businesses generally. These particular grants of police power are significant to the
issues at hand. Of great importance is the grant of
powPr in Section 10-8-84, since this comprehensive grant
of poliee vower is as broad as that possessed by the
state.
As noted in Wadsi('Orth 1;. Santaquin City, 83 Utah
321, 28 P.2d
( 1933), tht> state may grant to a city
as much powPr as the stah> itself possesses. The broad
wording of Section 10-8-8-! shows this is precisely what
was dom• with rPg-ard to the policP power.
Since the State has anthorit:·: un<lt-r its police power
to require certificates of convenience and m'cessity, Gilmer v. Pitblic Utilities Comm., 67 Utah 222, 2-±7 Pac. 28J
(1926), a city nPcessarily has hePn givt>n the same power
under 8Pction 10-8-84 wlwrP the state has not acted.
Even if it hP asslmwd that the broad grant of power
is not as wide in scorw as thP Stafr's power, th<> wording
of Section 10-8-84 is still hroad e11011gh to give the city
tlw powH to rPgnlak the amhnlancc> sNvice.
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In Ray u. City of Owensuoro, Ken. 19G7, 415 SW2d
77, the city's ordinance ref1uired ambulance operators
to obtain a franchise from the city and the city franehised one opt>rator. Plaintiff, another operator, claimed
the city had no authority to enact the ordinance. The
Court held:
'' vVe bdie,·e the only question to be answered
is whether the city had constitutional or 10gislative authority to enact the· ordinance and included in this question is the question of whether
the operation of an amhulance service is a proper
subject for franchise by goyermnental authority.
If the·
had authority to enact the ordinance,
certainly ayipellant lias not been denied ' ( t)he
right of acquiring and prott>cting property' under
sPction 01w, paragraph five of the Kentucky Constitntion nor has he lwPn deprived of his 'proyiwithout dne process of law' nor dPnied 'the
equal protection of the laws' 1mder section one
of tlw fourteenth auwndment to the Fnited States
Constitution.
'·rrhe right of a city to grant a franchise is
found in sections 163 and 1G4 of the Kentucky
Constitution, which n•ad as follows:
'Section 1G3. Public rtilities Must Obtain :F'rnnchis<" to Pse Streets. No street railway (J'as, \\·ater, steam heating, telephone,
or
light
within a city or
town, shall lw permitted or authorized. to
eonstrnct its tracks, lay its pipes or mams,
or er<'d its pol<•s, posts or other apparatus
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along, o:'er, under or across the streets, alleys
or pubhc grounds of a city or town, without
the consent of the proper legislative bodies
or boards of such city or town being first
obtained; but when charters have heen hentofore granted conferring 1'uch righhi, and
work has in good faith been begun thereunder, the provisions of this section shall not
apply.
'Section Hi4. 'l'enn of Franchise Limited: Advertisement and Bids. No county,
city, taxing district or other municipalit>·
shall he authorized or pernutted to grant any
franchise or privilege or make any contract
in reference thereto, for a term exceeding
twenty years. BeforP granting such franchise
or privilege for a tPrm of years, such municipality shall first, after due advertisement,
receive bids therefor publicly, and award the
sanw to the higla•st and best hidder; hut it
shall haw the right to rPjPct any or all bid,.
r:l'his section shall not apply to a trunk railway.'

"lt is apparent from the above that if the
snhject of the franchise is covered nnder section
1()3 and the ordinance mPds the technical r('qnir('nwnts of section lG-1, tlH'n it is valid. It u:ill be
noted thnt ,<;ection 163 deals u ifh certni·n sprcific
sillJ.f ects, to-tr it, street ra ihray, gas, water,
heating, telephone ur clcrtric liqlit compauies
within a city or tow11. lVe do 11ot belir1_:1' thr. right
granted citirs l1y this section is today limited. to
these specific utiliti('s. The p1trpose of th<' section
u:as to 9iH t71e city coutrol of the streets,
1
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and
grou_nds and to make it possible for
the city to provide the services of these utilities
its inhabitants. Therefore, the right granted
is not and properly should not be restricted to
thosP utilities enumerated, but applies to aU util-

itie.; and services which might today be proper
su7J1ects for control, when the original intent and
p11.rpose of the act is considered. (emphasis added)
* * * *

"vY e are of the opm10n that sufficient autl10rity exists in the constitution of this state to
support the ordinance. However, even without
this authority a municipality under its police
powers may provide for the health, safety and
welfare of its inhabitants and under these powers
would have sufficient authority to limit or regulate the use of emergency vehicles inelnding ambulances upon its rmhlic streets. As we view
the law, the city has the right to provide emergency ambulance service to its inhabitants, and
if the use of a franchise can hr an pffrrtive instrument or tool in the providing of a lilti1·e effective service, then cc>rtainly it is jnstifiP-d. By the
11se of a franchise the city can guarantee that
the service will always be available; that it will
be efficient and adequate; and that the operators
·will be qualified to act nndPr <>mergency conditions."

In City of Wichita v. Home Cab Co., 42 P.2d 972
(Kans. 1935), the cit)· passed an ordinance requiring
a CPrtificate of convenienc0 and neC('Ssity be issued by
the city as a requisite to the operation of a taxicab. The
l'onrt nplwld the power of the city to require the cer-
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tificates, citing Dresser v. City of Wichita, 1953 Pac.
(Kans. 1915). There plaintiff songht to enjoin 0nforcement of certain ordinancPs requiring a licrnse to operate
jitneys and other motor vehicles ovc•r the city streets.
'The power was upheld on the basis of statutes granting
the city power to adopt measures necrssary for the safety
of the traw·ling public, to constrnct and maintain the
streets, and to regulate lmsinessPs within tlw city. In
Home Cau, the Court held:
reftuiremenh; for municipal transportation n•nder it PSSPntial that tlw powPr to
reg11late by the gowrning hody he broad ....
decidPd wPight of authority supports the right
of a municipality eitlwr itself to take ovPr till'
conduct of a husin<'ss th<' imtmwr of operating\\'l1ich may affect tlw p11hlir welfare, or to put
it entirt>h- into the hands of a singlP indivi<lnal
or
. . . . \Ylmtevc•r natural right a citiZPn uiav !Ht\'<' to tra,-ersc• the streds of his city
with a 'motor vd1idP for the conwyancP of
family or his friends, no inherc>nt right t•xists to
devot<• his vehicle to th<> puhlie nse of carrying
passengers for hirP and appropriat0 to himself
the use of all the strPets for purposes of profit. .. ·
Beyond cpwstion, the eity could vacate' one or
mon· of tlw streets ov<'r whieh he rnig·ht cksirl'
to 01wratP. It ean not only rPqui I'<' him to pay a
license tax, hnt it
n·gnlak the mamwr of his
carn·ing on his enturprist'. . . . ln lie<'nsing tlw
nse
vehiel<'s on stn·ds, it has 1JP('I1 h<•ld that
the ('ity is c•x<'l'cising its police, ancl not its

"
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In accord ·with the Dresser decision is City of Wichita v.
Demers, 281 P.2d 1106 (Kans. 1955).

In Bw-di u. City of Jasper, Ala. 1945, 24 So. 2nd 543,
it ·was contended the city had no power to require a
permit to operate a taxi within the city. 'l'he Constitution
of Alabama and a statute said:
"No person, firm, association, or corporation
shall be authorized or 1wnnitted to use the streets,
avenues, alleys, or pnblic places of any city, town,
or village for the construction or operation of
any public utility or private enterprisP, without
first obtaining the consent of the proper authoriti0s of such cit>", town, or village."
'fhv Court held:
"'rhc framers of (the Constiti1t;on) must
have foreseen the incrPasingly acnte s·" ation on
tlw streets of our cities. 'l'he control of the streets
in com;prving the public safety and convenience
was deemed an essPntial sovereign vower in the
local authorities, who alone can keep an eye on
conditions, and 11wd the nt>Pds as they arist'.
"'!'he sanw authority also recognizes that the
privilege of opNating a taxi
as a common carri Pr of passeng0rs for lnrc' upon tlw
strePts of a city is in the natur0 of a franchisP
or t>asernPnt, aml that under onr Constitution it
ean not be acquired withont thr consent of the
<'ity antl1oriti<'s.
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"It is within the irrevisable discretion of the
city authorities to determine whether, and to
what extent, the service is needed and to fix and
determine the streets and to name the grantee
of the right."
In Corrao v. ilf onticr, ·wise. 1958, 90 N.\V.2d 623,
the Court said:
"The common council (of the city) has undoubted power to
and license the taxicab business. Sec. 85.82, Stats. rrhe public interest will be served by atkntion to the condition of
equipment, the rf'sponsihilit.\· of the opPraton;,
the adequacy of service, and the effect upon traffic, among other considPrations. We agree ·with
the city attornPy that the common council, at U1P
outset, had the broadest sort of discretion in
deciding how many and ·which applicants should
bP Ii Ct'Il SPd."

In E':r P((rte Lockhart, Mo. 1943, 171 tUV.2d 660, tht>
Court consi<lert>d a St. Lonis ordinance providing that
no person shall engage in the hnsiness of a public mover
without first obtaining a Iict>nsf' from the license collector and that no such license shall be issued until the
applicant shall haw ohtained a
of convenience
and nt>cessity from tlw Board of Pnhlic St>rvice. It held:
"No 01w 11as th<• inhPrt>nt right to carry on
his private hu:-;irn·ss npon the pnhlic. streds. It.
is not onlv th<· right, hut tlw irnpt•rative dnty, of
tlw (·ity to. rnnkt• and <•nforc<' :-;11('h n•gnlations co\·-
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Pring the usl' of its streets, improving at large
eost for the hem·fit of the pnhlic, as will be for
couvenit•nce and protection of the public....
'L'h<' provisions of tlw ordinance relative to securing a cc-rtificate> of convPniencc- and necessitv,
and tlw information reqni1wl to accompany tl;e
ap1Jlication therefor, aru reasonable and wholesome, required for tl1e infrlligPnt and proper
<·onsi<leration of the commission in <lett>rmining
wlwth<•r tlw convenirnee and ne(·Pssity of the
public n•quin•d or jm;tified the
or refusing tlw cc•rtificate, and tlw discretion lodged
in the conunission in passing upon same is a
proper, vvholesome, and constitutional power
given for the lwnefit and safety of the public,
and its ('Xercise of a dnty owed to thP pnhlic. Fletelwr v. Bordelon, Tex. Civ. App., 5G 8.W.2d 313,
loe. cit. 317. The 8uprPme Court of Illinoi1-; held
a similar ordinance of the City of Chi<'ago valid
in tlw etrne of People <'X rPl .Johns v. 'l'hompson,
jfayor, Pt al., 341 Ill. Hi6, 17:1 N.K l :17."

In l'. S. i:. rellou: C(/lJ Co., (TH'. Ill.
Snpp. 170, n•nrsi·d on othn grounds

ml F.
U.8. 218,

01 L.Ed. :2010, tit<· Comt said:
'' . . . 'L'hP eourts hav<' 1miforml:-· held that

tl10 licensing and regulation of the taxicab indns-

trv i8 a suhj<>ct for <·xercise solt{v h:-· a mnniciundPl' it:,; polic<' power.
c,onrt .and
th<' courts of" llJinois ha\'P held CJ11eago S tax1cah
onlinancPs a valid PXNcis<' hy thP eity of its
policP powPr and tlwy liave lH·lcl that th<' issuance
hv thP cifr of a majorit>· of tlw taxicah licPnses
t<: tlw dPf;nclant opNating compani<:•s in this case
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does not create a monopoly (citing Illinois cases).
In Rudack v. Yalentine (Spee. Term, N.Y. County,
1937), 1G3 Misc. 326, 295 N.Y.S. 97(i, aff'd, 1937,
274 NY. Gl5, 10 N.E.2d 577, tlw court held that
the licensing and regulation of tlw taxicab
try is a Yalid exercise of a municipality's polirP
power. Th<' court point.Pd ont that in
all cities the taxicab industry is treated as a
public utility under local regulations.

"It is not for tlw court to dd<•nnine whether
tlw city has actPd wisPly or unwisely in issuing
the majority of its lie<'nses to on<> interest or to
two corporations O\\'Il<'cl or eontrol!Pd by the same
interest. It is a qnestion rath<>r for the cletennination of the eity in th<:' public intl:'rest of ib
citiz<:'ns."
similar cases upholcling tlH• police power of
cities to

public sen·ice \·ehieles, see Courtesy

Cab Co. v. Johnson, \Vise. 19GO, 10;3 N.\V.2d 17 an<l
S cf; R Aida (f; Truck Service r. City of Charlotte, N.C.
19GG, 150 S. E.2d 743.
It has long he('n c•stahfo.;hed that when a business

is "burdened with tlw public int.Prest," tlH• µ;oyernmrntal
unit may regulatt> snch husin<>ss 11nder its polic<> powPr
to the exttmt necPssary to prot<'Ct the public. Any business effeckd with tlw public inten•st may h0 n•gnlate<l.

23
TV estern Colorado Power Co. v. Public Utilities Comrn.,
-!11 P.2d 785 (Colo. 19GG) ; (fates 1:. Easter, 354 P.2d 438
(Okla. l
State Road Comm. v. Utah Power & Light
Co., 10 rtah 2d 33:), 353 P.2d 171 ( 19GO); Ncbbia v .
.\71'11·

r.s.

York, 291 CS. 502,
113 (24
77).

rn

L.Ed. 9-W, llhmn v. Ill., 94

It has been held that thP policP powPr includes the
::wthorit:-· to impose any rnlP or regulation which is
dvsignt><l for the protection, safety and welfare of the

ci fo-\enry. R.c part e Mayes, (Taxicabs, Okla., 1917), 1G7
Pa('. 749; GilJl}()ns

·1;.

O.r;de11, :22 S.C. l, fi L.

Slau9hlfrlw11se Cases, s:3 S.C. :3(i, 21

23;

:394.

F'urtl1Prmore, it has been held that police power
Ill lls

t of rn•eC'ssi ty bt- as broad as the need for protection

to tht> pnhlic. Salt Lake City

1.'.

Board of E1 7u 1dio11, 52

('tali 540, 175 Pa('. G54 (1918); !JaJ1ids r. City of Portla11rl, :2(i5 Pac. 7!10 (Ore. 19:28); Camfield
1G7 U.S. 518, 4:2 L.fal. 2(i0.

(J

I/.

United States,

iwn this rule, it follows

that th(' police pow1·r of th1• ('it)· is as broad as that of

th<' state wlwn appliPd to loC'al affairs in an•as not pref•111ptPd by tlw state. City of 8cr1ttlc
:i!),") ( \\' asl1.

l'.

Ro9ers, 10() P.2<l

'1'!1<• rnany intPrPsts of tlw public in

arnhulanc<• snvic<>, notl'd ahov<', jnstif\ the authority to
irnposP tli1• broad n•gi.1lation co11krnplat<'d hy the city
or,li11a11c<> in quPstion.
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Regardless of the quantum of police power possessed
by a city, the general case law as to when it can be nsed
and the extent of its use justifies the regulation contemplated by the ordinance- in question.
In State ex rel. Schaefer v. City of Spokane, 186
Pac. 864 (Wash. 1920), the relator sut>d to require the
city to issue him a license to operate a jitney bus in the
city. The city had prPviously refused to issue a license
because it determined that the area \Ylwre the relator
asked to operate was
adf'quately served by another bus company. rrhe question of the authority of
the city to refuse to grant a license on this ground was
raised by the relator. The Court held that although government power is limited as to the control of most businesses, greater regulation is justified in businesses which
use the public streets as tlw object of their business,
that use of streets is a privilege to he granted or denied
by the government and that power to grant or to deny
includes the power to grant to one and not another when
a public interest will be sPrYed thereby. No statutory
grant of power was cited by the Court, hut the decision
·was based on the inherent powf'r to provide for the
safety and welfare of citizc->ns of the city.
In

J( e11yon

II otel Co.

1'.

Oreqon Slwrtl i11e Railroad,

G2 Utah 3G4, 220 Pac. 382 (1923), tlte plaintiffs commenced an action against the railroad company and the
Commissimwrs of Salt Lake City to enjon them from
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enforcing an ordinance which restricted the places where
taxicabs and other vehicles which carried passengers
for hire could park. Plaintiffs contended that the ordiHance was beyond the power of the citv to enact. This
Conrt held that under the police imwer the city may
enact ordinances for the safety of its citizens, including
the regulation of traffic on the streets.
In Ex zmrte 1II artinez, BS P.2d 10 (Calif. 19±3), a
habeas corpns action by one convicted of operating a
taxicab at rates more than fixed by the city, petitioner
contended the city did not have power to prescribe rates.
Ileld, since the state had not attempted to regulate taxicabs, the cities may do so pursuant to their police power,
which ·was :
"Any city, to\\'n or to·wnship may make and
(>Uforee within its limits all such loenl, police,
sanitary, and other n·gnlation:-; as an· 1,ot in confliet witlt tlte gen(>ral law:-;."
Salt Lah City's grant of poW<'l' is far mol'(' sriecific.
ln E'.1· parte Lee, 1953 Pac. 192 (Calif. 1915), a bus
linP yiolakd an onlinance n•quiring buses operating in
tl1P eity to ahidt\ l1y a :-;chPclnl<', and artion was brought

:SPPking dPelaration tltat tlw ordinanee was invalid as
1.lH• <·ity's pmrc•r. 'l'lw Conrt ht>ld that the police
110\\'Pr ol' tlw city is snfficie'nt to allow the regulation
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of motor vehicles using the streets. The Court said the
police is as extensive as the need for protection of the
public reqnirenwnts.
See also GO C.J.S., Motor Yehicles Sec. 45, p. 194,
33 for numerous other cases sustaining the power of
cities to regulate public service vehicles based on their
general police powers, their power to license or regulate businesses, or to regnlate use of the streets as
d<'rived from the legislatur<'.
See 9 l\1cQuillon, Municipal Corporations, section
2G.176 citing many cases upholding as a valid exercise
of police power ordinances requiring a showing of public
need as a condtion to taxicab 01wration.

Pond, Public Utilities, St>ctions 50 to 52 provide:
50. Pow<>r to prO\·ide mnnici 1ial publie
utilities gern•rally implied. - The principle of
the implied powers of municpal C'orporations to
providP themselves -with municipal 1mhlic utilities
is
recognized h;,- onr courts.
th<>ir lilwral recognition of th(' existenee of m1plll'd
powers more than in any other wa)' they
given full effret to the imrpo;-;t•, and prad1:al
recognition to tlw c01m1wreial obj<'ets, for
municipal eorporatio11;-; an· <'stahlish<·<l. The ti:·Jd
i;;; natnralh· a frrtilP om· for judiC'ial l<·gislat1011
ronstr;1etion, and it has lw<'n fully developed
by our courts in gi \·ing pffrct to tlw pom'rs
sa ry to a full <•njoyrn<'nt nrnl a eornplPlP real1za-

27
tion of the advantages of such corporations, to
tlw .end that the gr0att•st public good might be
a ttamed. Decisions giving the most complete
freedom of activity to municipalities, consistent
their best interests and not dero()"atory of
specific statutory regulations, represent°the great
of authority. It is only a few of our courts
that refuse the right of municipal corporations
to keep abreast of the times and to conduct their
affairs to their best advantage and for the greatest hern·fit of their citizens.
51. Best interests of municipality the test.
In view of the fact that practically the sole
purpose of such corporations in their
as business concerns is to benefit the people who
inhabit them and thus constitute their stockholders, so to speak, it is submittt>d that the present
advantage of their citizens and the prospective
adrnncement of thPse organizations should be the
test of the control exercised ovPr tlH•m by the
legislature and the courts. ThP only 0'}11•r
1·,·en rernott·ly
is the state ai.J ; :sinterPsts in such mattPrs are identieal with those of
tlw rntmicipality. Since the intt>rests of the two
parties involved are th<> same it is only rpasonahle to snppm-;e that the one party, in legislating
for the oth<•r intends alwavs to accomplish the
'
.
gn•atest good for the gTeatest nurnlwr concerned.
>)(<.

o)(:

if.<

''#

"§ 52. OnlY ge1wral powe1·s expressly giwn
l>v st;tute. - · lh•eause of tlw many details in
and thP varying circumstances and
changing conditions of the diffen'nt cities:
gPrwrnl legi;,;lation with ref<.runcP to them is ad-
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visable or possibl\c>. This necessitates the exercise
of much jndgmPnt and of many impliPd powers
by the cities, in whose officers must be vested a
wide discretion. And in construing such general
statutes in a particular case regard must be had
for the facts and circumstances of the case in
hand so that the general law as applied will give
the best results. It is in determining the legislative intent and in giving such intention thr most
favorable practical application to the particular
city of ·which it ·will admit, that the courts take
the opportunity to advance the intPrPsts by extending the scope of the activity of such municipality as its welfare re(1nires. And it is submitted
that for these practical reasons the authorities
·with very few exceptions favor a decided increase
of the sphPre of municipal activity because the
lw:st interests of these corporations demand it."
Section 87 cites numerons casl·s making it amply clear
the courts liberally recognize the implied municipal
power to regulate public service n·lticlcs, including the
power to limit the number then•of.
Section 41-G-3, 1T.C.A.
while not conferring
power to regulate, clearly illustrates the Legislatnre
recognizes the cities have this power. It says:
"'Authorized
vehicle.' (Definition) Yt>hicles of tl1e fin"' dPpartnwnt, police whick•s, and SllCh amlntla Ji,Cl'S and emerw·ncy
hicles of municipal d('parternnts or public
corporations us ar(' designated_
;;uthonzed by
the department or local a1dl10rdzes.

:e-
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Appellant's simple staternl'nt (brief p. 22) that Sections 10-8-11, -30, -80, -G1, and -84, U.C.A. 1953 "have
no bearing" and "are revPnue regulation rneasurPs" falls
by its own \\·eight. Onl)· src:tion 80 dPals with revenue;
all otlwrs dPal with municipal police power to regnlatP
streets and
for safety and health, as shown b::
their own language and the foregoing cases. Section 80
is citPd to show the enumeration of specific powers is
not intt>nded by the Legisla.tme to limit the general
grant of authority conferred.
C. THE POWER CONFERRED BY UTAH CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE XI, SECTION 5 GIVES LEGISLATIVE CITIES POWER TO PASS THIS ORDINANCE.

This section f'X}fft>ssly gives charter citi<·s power "to
grant loeal public utility franehist>s" and to regulate
them.
111 TVrulsu·orth 1J. S111itar;uin City, 83 Utah 321, 28
lGl, 1G8, tlw Comt said:

''. . . rrhe question then is, A re the powers
enumerated in tlw ai11t>ndrn0nt (Articl0 XI)
equally available to citiPs operating under lrgislativ<' Pnactrnent 'J The answf'r \\·e think must l1e
in tlw affirmatiw, at least to the e.rtcnt that the
J,<'gislot11rc hos conferred any s11ch pou•ers 011
tlir eitic:-: .... Th<' r0s<'l'voir of pmn'r is the sa11w,
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and we can perceive of no r<'ason to distinguish
b.etween the charter adopted by the peo1>le of a
city and one enacted by general law of the Legisbased nwre1y on the origin of the legislation ....
"\Ve think the enumeration of the power to
?01Tow money on the security of a utility or its
mcome, or both, was intended by the people in
adopting the constitutional amendment to place
such power within the scope of municipal action,
and was clearly inknded to be availablt> to chartered cities in forming their own charters and
.
.
'
m addition thereto by use of the language, 'power
to be conferred upon tlw cities hy this sPction,'
just as clearly was intended to enumPratP a powt>r
which the Legislature might, if it chose, confer 011
cities depE>nding on general law for their organization and authorty."
\Vhile the vVadsworth case held that leislative cities do
not necessarily have all tlw powers enumerated in the
amendment because the amend111ent i:s not sPlf-execnting,
it did hold that all
power:,.; em1111erat<'d in the amen<lf Pnt are equally available to cities 01wrating under fop;i'lative enactnwnt, "at least to the <>xt1mt that the LegislatnrP has conferred any sneh powers on the citi<>:s." 1'lw
LPgislatnre has hy the m11en(h11Pnt ( Artich• XL) C'Ollferred on all eharter eitit>s the pO\H'l' to fran('hise nil
public utilitie:s, local in Pxtent, \Yhieh indudes common
carriers (5-1--2-1 (:29) ). ']'he L('gi:-datnre has confrrn•tl on
all citi<>s power to "r<>gnlat('" and "pn'scrilH' tltP c0111pen-
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sation of other public conveyances'' and "all others pursuing lih occupations" (10-8-39) and to "authorize the
. . . 01wrntion of (public transportation systems) by
others" (10-8-14). rl'he Legislature has to that extent confc.rr('d "any such powers on the cities." Did the Legislntnrl' also intend to confer on legislative cities the power
to franchise local conunon caniers As in W ads1corth,
is ''no rPason to distinguish hE•tween a charter
adopted
the• people of a city and one enacted hy the
gt>neral law of the LegislaturP." 'l'hus, it appears the
Legislature did impliedly confer on legislative cities the
power to grant public utility franchises, including ambnlancr franchises, local in extent.

In City of llf ill Falley'/.:. Saxton (Cal. 19±0) 106 P.2d
th(• Conrt said:
"A.rnicus curiae advance the poi1 t that the
ronstitutional section is not self-ex<-<
and
that hem'(' the city is without tl1e power to act in
tltP
of a h•gi::;lative enabling ad. It is then
eontended that, sinee certain St'ction::; of tlw l\f unicipal Corporations Act fail to mention bus lines
specifically, the city is without i>ower to establish
tlwrn. Both the premise and th<' eonclusion are
enon(•ous. rl'he Constitution expressly authorir.Ps
'anv' cit\' to establish and OJH'rate 1mblic 'rnrks
for.
It f'xpressly authorizes sueh
citv to furnish 'sueh se1Tiees to inhahitants outside its bonndari<·s.' Here is the grant of pO\\'N.
If the legislature should attempt hy statutory enarbn<>nt to <lPil)' or withhold tlH' powN as to any
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special class of cities its act would he clearly
unconstitutional. If it attempted the same resuit
indirectly by failing to mention th<C power in some
corollary legislation, its act to that extent would
have no effect on the co11stitutional grant." (Emphasis added.)
POINT IL

THE STATE HAS NOT PRE-EMPTED THE REGULATION OF AMBULANCES AND TAXIS AND NO
CONFUSION RESULTS FROM CITY REGULATION.

\Vhile the State of I:- tali has entered the field of
motor vehicle regulation through Title 5-1, Chapter 6,
U.C.A. 1953, ambulances and taxis operating within 15
miles of any city are specifically excepted from the regulation. Thus, the cities are free to regulate this portion
of the motor vehicle industry. Seetion 5-!-6-12(f), FC.A.
1953, provides:
"Except for the provisions of 5-1--fi-17 relative
to the requirements of insurance, 5-l--(j-21 relative
to safety regulations, and 5-l--G22 relative to accident report, no portion of this act shall apply: .. ·
( f) to motor vehiclPs ... when used as hears<•s,
ambulances, or licensed taxieahs, operating- within
a 15 rnile radius of the limits of any
or town."
The exclusion <'annot lH• eonstrue<l as showing an intent
to kep arnlrnlanees out of the fi<·l<l of regnlat<•d industries
due to language of -1-1-G-:3 (a), CC.A. 193:). 1\loreovN, tlu·
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itference to the territory around the city in 54-G-12(f)
imli<>att•s that loeal regulation was expected.
:Most important, Article XI, Section 5 of the Utah
Constitution clearly authorizes charter cities to franchise
utilities, ·which includes motor carriers. In light of this,
it cannot he said the Motor Carrier Act pre-empted the
field as to chart<•r cities and, (>rgo, did not as to legislati \·e eitiPs.
Because the public inten•st is so greatly affected by
tnxi and mnhnlaneP operations, the Legi::;lature would
liaY<' P:qm•ssl.Y said
is to he no municipal rPgulat1on, notwithstanding the l\Totor Canil•r Act Pxrmption
of eity op(' rations, had it so intPndetl.
'L'lw ::;tafrs in the cases sustaining municipal police
power to regulate cabs and ambnlanct>s ha\.<' r· gulation
of intra-::;tate carriers, yd tlierP is no ol1jectio11 iaised to
mtmic·ipal n•gulation on thl' hasis of stat<' pn•-ernption.

''Unless the municipality has lwl'n grantP<l
Pxclusive po\\·Pr, the legislatin control of publie
service vehicles, either directly or through its
designated administrativt> liody, is superior to any
conflicting aetion of the lPgislative bod)· of a munieipality. HO\n•ver, in the absPnee of a rt>peal or
conflict, tlw pO\n'r of tlw municipality may he
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exercised notwithstanding the exisknce of some
statutory regulations pertaining to the same suhject; and the exercise of such power is not inconsistent with a statutf> regulating motor vehicles
generally."
It is noted appellant's brief cites absolutely no authority whatever for the proposition urged. Instead, we
are given a pure "shotgun" appeal.

Appellant ar1:.1ws that a small city might attrmpt
to regulate throughout the 15 mile radius of its boundary
and into adjoining cities, or that cities might overlap
their regulation. The proposition is illogical, is without
basis in the
and is contrary to the fact. There is
nothing in the record to show the ordinance has in any
way affected appellant's operations outside of Salt Lake
City. Appellant is operating in Salt Lake County outside
Salt Lake City, and without certification or regulation
and without interference by Salt Lake City Corporation
or any governmental authority.
there has
1

lwen no objection to appellant's merely hPing on tlw
streets of Salt Lab• City without originating trips for
hire in Salt Lake City. Indeed, its tPrminal is at 1G95
East 5th South within f-lalt Lak<' City. lt alwa:·;s
before and after passage of thP ordinane(' amendment,
and while the injunction \Yas in foreP, hronght
into Salt Lake City on trips originating out of tlw city
without objection hy tlw City. Thns, ap1wllant's theo-
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retical, "ljteral," unfounded and illogical objections to
tlw ordimmc0 are frrelevant and afford no real basis for
appeal.

In N.ational lnclrmnity Co.

Harver, D.C. Mo. 295
F'. Supp. 749 (19G9) the Joplin ordinance required private ambulance operators to show the public convenience
and necessity rrquired their proposed service and if a
eertificate "'ere granted, to post certain liability insurancP. The ordinance contained no reference to any lirnitt>d radius of operations. Defendant, a certifiPd carrier,
posted insurance with a fifty mile radius restriction and
an aecidPnt occurred more than fifty rnil<'s from .Joplin.
'l'he insurer denied coverage, questioning the validity of
the ordinance and saying that even if Yalid, the city had
lH>\\'t•r
to regulak operations in J opli11. The Court
l1Pld the ordinancP valid, heing '•an exer('isf' of the basic
polite po\\'Pl' . . . ch·sig:iwd to protPct tlw public generally" and said:
t'.

"Jn this
of rapid transportation with
daily need for taxicabs, ambulances and othPr
puhiic convc>yances to travel in, out of, and into
the citv limits to airports, hospitals, to nH'dical
center; and to scenes of personal injuries on the
highway, thP needs of Hrnnicipal
?f
citizens of municipalities and the travellmg public
Rhonld not he nwasnred narrowly by ci(Y boundarieR. It is a reasonabk exercise of l\fissouri
municipal legal pmn•rs to rt'qnire
effec1wvon<l the eity limitR, to b0 proYided
muniei1;a1 licensees whose ha:,;e of operations is
within the municipality."
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Appellant nc>vPr did plead the existence of am
amendment to the ordinance, and its answer and amended
answer both admitted the ordinance was as pleaded in
the complaint. By stipulation of November 10, 19G9, the
parties stipulated as to certain facts and judgment was
entered November 11, 1969. Appellant did not make
any offer of proof whatever as to any damagt- to appellant. Therefore, there is no need to remand for determination as to whether appellant was injured by failure
of the injunction to recite the ordinance amendment.
POINT III.
THE ORDINANCE DOES NOT VIOLATE THE
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE UTAH
AND UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS.

Appellant contends that since the issuance of acertificate to respondent Intermountain, the latter has a
monopoly and the ordinance violat(>s the <>qua! protection
claus(•.
Appellant ignores the fact that tlw very purpose>
of regulating utilily businesses affected with the public
interest is to enconrage a monopoly to prevent duplication
and waste and to protect the source of the service from
competition so as to assure that the service will continue.
Public Utilities Comm. v. Garvilock, 5+ Utah +oG, 181 P.
272 (1919); Bambergrr Transzwrtatimz Co. v. Public
Service Comm., 115 Utah 27+, 20+ P.2d 1G:1 (19+9). See
Whaley v. Denoir County (N.C. 19G9) Hi8 SE 2d 411.
particularly with rt>g-anl to arnlmlam·<· opPrations.
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The ordinance does not create a monopol.\· or grant
an exclusive franchise . .i.\lor« than one operator can he
u•rtifi<>d aftPr consideration of t1it· faetors mentioned in
fipction 7 of the ordinanc<'.

"Grand-daddy'' certificah•s may he, and traditionally
are, iss11ed ,,-ithout hearing to Pxisting canit•rs at time
ol' adoption of tlw n•gulato1·y legislation. Tndred, to not
n·eogniz<' tlw (•xisting canie1·'s rights \\·onld lw to uncondevrive him of its bmsiness. Whaley v. Le11oir County (N.C., 1969) 1(i8 S.E. 2d 411. In any event,
tlw record certainly does not sho\\· that certificates were
granted to Interrnountain's predPcessors in intPrest with
or "·ithout hearing or ·with or without detenuination of
public conyrnipnc•p and necessity. 'I'hat is an entirely
irn•1Pva11t argmrwnt, one \d1ich is outside tliP n•cords and
<l<>nif•d.
Av1wllant's siate1nt•nt that a certificatP \\"as granted
to Intennountain, without hearing, crPating an unbreakable monopoly, is not only uncontroverted, it is declared
a gross distortion. Pnblic hearings were held, after pubfo.;hed notice before the Board of Commissioners of Salt
'
Lake City and the Utah Public Service Commission almost
two years ago on Intermonntain's avplication to pnrchase,
J'or substantial amounts of money, the certificates of Intennonntain's two pre<lc>cessors. '1.1l10se hearings were
atPnded by tlte managt•mPnt or co1msel of appellant, who
entPred no objection
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Appellant's argument that the ''door is locked to
any additional ambulance service'' is contrary to obvious
fact. ·The complaint that supporting witnesses can never
be obtained for a hearing is pure hogwash. Applicants
for passenger authority present the same type of evidence on the same convenience and necessity issues to
the Interstate Commerce Commission, the fifty state pnLlic service commissions and innumerable municipal bodies
time and time again. There are plenty of groups, such
as hospitals, medical associations, doctor's clinics, police
and fire departments, etc., all of whom have direct knowledge of the adequacy of existing ambulance service and
the need for additional service, who could give favorable
testimony if the facts justified such. Such testimony can
be admitted even though such pen;ons do not usually
themeslves use, in the sense of ride in, tlw vehicle; indeed, they probably have bettt•r information and opportunity to oh serve than actual ride rs ,,·ho are infirm by
definition. In Ashirorth Transfer Co. v. Public Service
Commission, 2 Utah 2d 33, 2()8 P.2d 990, a newspaper
business editor and an oil gf'Olo1:,rist, testified of the need
for service in the petroleum industry and this Court said:
"These men are probably better qualified to
off er a picture of the entirP industry than would
he a small oil opPrator using trucking servicf:'s."
In Lake Shorr J1J otor Coach Lin rs v. Salt Lake Transpor-

tation Co. (Oct. 22, l9GS) 21 etah 2d -1-22, -1:-l:G P.2d .JJll,
a grant of additional siµ;htsePing and charter bus author-
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ity to a passenger carrier was sustained on evidence
'
characterized by the Court as:
"Testimony of witnesses from private busicivic organizations and State government
md1cates that there is a present and steadilv
growing need for the extension of the service df
the defendant Salt Lake Transportation Company as granted in order to make available adequate transportation to the scenic attractions and
the skiing resorts of the State; and there was also
testimony that such services as presently exist
through plaintiff carriers were either inadequate
as performed ,or as made available to the public,
in that they were not sufficiently promoted and
publicized to accomplish the necssary and desired
purpose.''
It is indeed strange to hear a potential carrier complain
evidt>ncl' is not available as to the necessity of its proposed service. It would seem plain business f'('nse would
dictate that if, after market study, one cannot find anyone to say his proposed service is needed, then one would
not risk his time and capital on the proposal.

Appellant's claim really sho\\'S there is no public
convenience or necessity for appellant's services, not that
plaintiff has a locked-in monopoly.
'l'here is in fact no conspiracy by the City to maintain a monopoly situation, or to grant Intermo1mtain
an exclusive franchise, for after all, a certificate was in
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fact issued to appellant, without hearing, and therein
arose this lawsuit.
POINT IV.
APPELLANT HAS NO STANDING AND IS ESTOPPED TO ASSERT THE COUNTERCLAIM IN
THIS ACTION.

In this case, appellant applied for and has been
issued a certificate of convenience and necessity pursuant to the terms of the ordinance which it now calls into
question. It denies in this action ( R-29) the certificate
was improperly issued, and but for the complaint and
injunction
appellant would have availed itself
of the benefits of the ordinance. It subsequently went
to regular hearing under the ordinance seeking a certificate and would have availed itself of benefits of tlw
ordinance had the certificate been granted (R-98). Under
these circumstances, the Utah law is clear that appellant
has no standing to contest the validity of an ordinance
from which it attempted to benefit. Ke11t Cl11lJ v. Tornnto, G Utah 2d 67, 305 P.2d 870 (1957); Salt Lake City
Lines vs. Salt Lake City, G Utah 2d, 428, 315 P.2d 85D
(1975).

CONCLUSION
It is submitted the ordinance is a valid exercise of

municipal power, and that ap1wllant is

to den)
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it. The need for local regulation and control, in the public interest, is clear. The judgment should be affirmed.

\\THEREFORE, it is submitted the judgment herein
should be affirmed and that respondents should be
awarded their costs.
Respectfully submitted,
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